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THE PERFECT TENDER RULE-AN "ACCEPTABLE"
INTERPRETATION
Michael A. Schmitt* and David Frisch**
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE Uniform Commercial Code was designed to simplify, clarify, modernize, and make uniform the law of commercial transactions. 1 As is sometimes the case, however, conflicts arise among
various sections which tend to be resolved over the course of time
through amendment, scholarly comment, and judicial interpretation.
One conflict which seems to have resisted resolution for almost
twenty years involves the buyer's right to reject under section 2-601 2
and the seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2). 3 The conflict is
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. J.D., 1973, Yale Law
School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D., 1975, University of
Miami; LL.M., 1980, Yale University.
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1978) provides, in part:
Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
1.

(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
[hereinafter all references to the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1978 Official Text].
2.

U.C.C. § 2-601 reads:
Buyer's Rights on Improper Delivery
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts
(Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual
limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of
delivery fail in any respect to confrom to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
3. U.C.C. § 2-508 provides:
Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may sea-
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simple and straightforward. When a seller makes a nonconforming
tender, the buyer in a sale of goods transaction may choose to exercise his section 2-601 right to reject-often called the "perfect
tender rule." 4 Upon notice of rejection, however, the seller will often
attempt to "cure" the defect, asserting the right to cure pursuant to
section 2-508(2). 11 To the extent that the seller's right to cure is
broadly interpreted, the perfect tender rule becomes something less
than perfect. 6 To the extent that section 2-508(2) is narrowly interpreted, the perfect tender rule is strengthened.
The focus of this article will be on the inherent conflict between
the buyer's right to reject and the seller's right to cure. We will first
review both the scholarly commentary addressing the issue and the
judicial interpretations of the rejection-cure conflict. We will then
propose a resolution to the conflict, or an acceptable interpretation,
which serves to promote the expressed purposes and policies of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 7
II.

NON-CONFORMING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONFLICT

The Commentators

A.

Interpreting the wording of section 2-508(2) and the appropriate
scope of its applicability has proven no easy task for legal scholars.
Professor Peters notes that the section fails to achieve its principal
objective of preventing surprise rejections by unscrupulous buyers
by being couched in "remarkably obscure" language. 8 She focuses
upon the reference to "monetary allowance" as being the section's
principal ambiguity. 9 In exploring three possible readings of this
phrase, she finds that all either lead to implausible results or results
sonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
4. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
206-09 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Peters].

See supra note 3.
Peters, supra note 4, at 209-16.
7. See supra note 1.
8. Peters, supra note 4, at 210.
9. Id. at 211-12.
5.
6.
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contrary to public policy. 10 She abandons her interpretative effort by
concluding that section 2-508(2) should be amended to eliminate the
confusion and that 2-601 should be redrafted to eliminate any outright power to reject. 11
Professor Nordstrom asserts that the primary difficulty in interpreting section 2-508(2) lies in determining the subject of the
"which" clause. 12 He interprets the section as being applicable only
to "sellers who knew their tender was non-conforming but who reasonably believed that their buyers would accept the non-conforming
tender-only to meet a surprise rejection." 18 The basis of his reasoning is that the application of the section to any other seller would
make the reference to monetary allowance redundant, as a seller
who believes that his tender is conforming has no reason to consider
a reduction in price. 14 He further contends that as a matter of policy
sellers who are mistaken as to the quality of their goods do not
merit additional time to do what they agreed to do by a date which
has already passed. 111 Beyond this he offers no further criteria upon
which to ascertain when a seller has reasonable grounds to believe
that a buyer would accept a nonconforming tender, one of the conditions precedent to the right to cure as specifically set forth in section
2-508(2).
Another approach to the problem focuses upon the good faith of
the seller in making the nonconforming tender and, in the alternative, upon the good faith of the buyer in rejecting such a tender. 16 As
one commentator writes: "This approach seems more sensible than
any attempt to develop a rigid set of standards under which the factor of good faith (or true surprise) might be lost." 17 We agree that
the good faith of both buyers and sellers plays a central and possibly
even pivotal part of the analysis of section 2-508(2) and its effect
upon a buyer's right to reject for any nonconformity. We also believe, however, that the express wording of section 2-508(2) relieves
not only the courts from the onerous task of determining contract
10.

Id.

11.

Id. at 215-16.

12.

See R.

13.

Id. at 321.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES

319-22 (1970).

16. See Note, UCC Section 2-508: Seller's Right to Cure Non-Conforming
Goods, 6 RuT.-CAM. L. REV: 387 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UCC Section 2-508].
17. Id.at400.
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disputes based primarily on findings of the good or bad faith of the
parties, but also relieves the parties themselves from the uncertain
and unpredictable results which such determinations would necessarily produce.
Professors Summers and White argue:
[A] seller should be found to have had reasonable cause to believe
that his tender would have been acceptable any time he can convince
the court that (1) he was ignorant of the defect despite his good faith
and prudent business behavior or (2) he had some reason such as
prior course of dealing or trade usage which reasonably led him to
believe that the goods would be acceptable.' 8

While the second of the two suggestions reflects both sound reasoning and a valid interpretation of the comments to section 2-508, 19 we
believe that to allow a seller, ignorant of the nature or quality of the
goods which he sells, to cure under section 2-508(2) would encourage
sloppy business practices and create a right to cure in virtually every
instance. This approach is unfounded in the words or purposes of
the subsection. 20 To allow a merchant to assert ignorance as a justification for the right to cure is to allow him to assert that which he,
by definition, cannot claim. :n A merchant holds himself out to the
public as being one with superior knowledge of the things which he
sells. To allow such a seller to come into court, after the fact, and
seek relief against a disillusioned buyer based upon ignorance, is to
allow the seller to play a devilish and unconscionable trick upon the
customers who placed their faith in him.
18. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 322 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
19. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-508 provides, in part: "However, the seller is not
protected unless he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that the tender would be acceptable. Such reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the
making of the contract."
20.

See infra Part III.

21. U.C.C. § 2-104 contains the following definition of "merchant":
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.
(emphasis added).
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Professors Summers and White further advocate forced money
allowances for insubstantial nonconformities, even in the absence of
a usage in trade obligating a buyer to accept such reductions. 22 The
professors assume the position that the section can be conformed
"in wise judicial hands" so as to achieve the reasonable expectations
of the parties and to thwart the "chiseler who seeks to escape a bad
bargain."23 As will be pointed out shortly, there has been a paucity
of wisdom guiding the judicial determinations of the 2-508(2) and 2601 relationship. The cases show that section 2-508(2) has been not
so much directed against "chiseling" buyers but in favor of chiseling
sellers. The professors leave their analysis of the section without addressing the scope and meaning of the word "acceptable."
Probably the most pedestrian analysis and application of section
2-508(2), and the one adopted by a number of courts, is suggested
by Professor Hawkland. 24 Hawland's test focuses upon the magnitude of the defect in determining whether a seller should be given
an opportunity to cure. 25 Under this analysis, a seller would be allowed to cure a tender in all cases where the buyer would not be
subjected to "any great inconvenience, risk or loss." 26 Though admittedly offering the prospect of ease of application, this approach
is not founded on the words of the section and diametrically opposes
the clear purport of section 2-601. 27 Again, as with the "good faithbad faith" approach, the parties are left facing ad hoc determinations and the inconsistent results which these produce. The only difference here is that the focus is upon the magnitude of the defect
involved rather than the good faith of the parties. Further, as with
the "good faith-bad faith" approach, this analysis fails to take into
22.

WHITE

&

SUMMERS,

supra note 18, at 322-23.

23. Id. at 324.
24. See Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Hawkland].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 724.
27. One commentator has pointed out that judicial decisions have failed to consider the clear language of section 2-508(2) when legislating a "magnitude of the defect" test. Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Rejection and Revocation-Seller's
Right to Cure a Nonconforming Tender, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 938, 949 (1969). It is the
authors' opinion that "[t]he major-minor defect test does not incorporate the element
of seller's reasonable belief of acceptability of a tender and for this reason is unreflective of the statutory language." Accordingly, "the right to cure a nonconforming
tender after the time for performance has passed shall depend upon whether the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable . . . . " Id.
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account that there are differing standards of good faith with respect
to merchant and nonmerchant buyers and that these differing standards have a bearing upon the effect of the magnitude of the defect.
Essentially, a consumer buyer is obligated to exercise only "honesty
in fact" in the transaction involved, a purely subjective standard. 28
A merchant, on the other hand, is additionally held to observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 29 With
this in mind, the possibility becomes apparent that defective goods
which a consumer buyer, in all honesty, finds unacceptable could
not, in good faith, be rejected by a merchant buyer. 30
A review of the scholarly commentary shows a wide divergence of
opinion as to the proper interpretation of the section 2-601-2508(2) conflict. The factors suggested include the good faith of the
parties, the magnitude of the defect in the product, prior course of
dealing, and the amount of the monetary allowance. The result is
that the academic literature fails to provide a concise and easily understandable resolution to the rejection-cure conflict.

B. Judicial Interpretations
It is not surprising to discover, after reviewing the various tests
and criteria the commentators have proposed, that the language of
section 2-508(2) has not received uniform interpretation by the
courts when faced with actual contract disputes. What is surprising
is the manner in which the courts have avoided, circumvented, and
otherwise ignored the specific requirement of section 2-508(2) that
before a seller may have time, in addition to that agreed to for performance, in which to cure a nonconforming tender, he must have
made such tender reasonably believing that it would be acceptable
to the buyer. 31 In fact, most courts, when presented with the issue of
a seller's right to cure, have simply ignored the existence of the two
subsections in section 2-508. It is often difficult to determine
whether the disposition of a particular case was made pursuant to
section 2-508(1) or section 2-508(2). 32
28. "Good faith" is defined in a general sense as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
29. In the case of a merchant, good faith requires, in addition to honesty in fact,
the "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
u.c.c. § 2-103(l)(b).
30.

See infra Part III.

31.

See supra note 3.

32.

See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. _, 480 S.W.2d 133 (1972);
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Any discussion of the application of section 2-508(2) by the
courts must begin with the case of Wilson v. Scampoli. 33 This case
involved a new color television set having a "reddish tinge" to the
picture. Refusing to allow the seller to remove the set to make the
inspection essential to determine the cause of the defective performance, the buyer first demanded a new set and then sought the return
of her money. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court granting rescission of the sales contract. Addressing itself to
the seller's right to cure, the court stated: "[A] retail dealer would
certainly expect and have reasonable grounds to believe that merchandise like color television sets, new and delivered as crated at the
factory, would be acceptable as delivered and that, if defective in
some way, he would have the right to substitute a conforming
tender." 34 After finding that the seller had the right to cure, the
question then before the court was "whether the dealer may conform his tender by adjustment or minor repair or whether he must
conform by substituting brand new merchandise." 311 The court went
on to declare that adjustments in the nature of a "minor" repair
would be an acceptable method of cure.
Shortly after Wilson was decided, a similar situation presented
itself in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith. 38 Upon driving a new
automobile home from the dealer's showroom, the buyer discovered
that it was practically inoperable because of a transmission so defective as to require replacement. In its decision, the court focused on
what was intended by the term "cure" as used in section 2-508. 37
The court refused to permit the dealer to substitute a new transmission, reasoning that the magnitude of this type of defect upset the
peace of mind of the buyer and indeed shattered the buyer's faith in
the vehicle. The court reasoned, "Once their faith is shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with apprehension. " 38 What is conspicuously absent
Transcontinental Refrigeration Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 12, 585 P.2d 1301; Conte v.
Devan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Hayes v. Hetinger, 228
N.W.2d 181; Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 444, 256
A.2d 522 (1968).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 849.
Id.
99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 458, 240 A.2d at 205.
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from the decision is any discussion regarding the seller's right to
cure.
Some courts have apparently read Wilson and Zabriskie as establishing a "magnitude of the defect" test for determining when a
seller may have additional time within which to cure a defective
tender, and have themselves applied such a test. In Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc., 89 the court cited Wilson and held:
[U]nder the Uniform Commercial Code where the buyer rejects the
goods or chattels when delivered because they are non-conforming, an
offer can be made by or on behalf of the seller to repair or cure the
minor defects, which should be accepted by the buyer and rescission
could not be had. 40

Wilson was also relied upon by the court in Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc.'1 in which the seller was permitted additional time to cure simply because the defects were characterized as
minor. A final example of what appears to be the application of a
"magnitude of the defect" test can be found in the relatively recent
case of Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co. 42 In the
court's view "any right to cure should be limited to cases in which
the defects are minor, and . . . the seller has no right to cure defects
which substantially impair the good's value." 43
A second theoretical approach to the interpretation and application of section 2-508(2) implicitly adopted by some courts has been
to focus on the element of good faith. 44 Since section 2-508(2) is
aimed at protecting the seller from surprise rejections, courts have
considered good faith surprise at a rejection as constituting "reasonable grounds to believe that a [non-conforming tender] would be acceptable." For example, in Wilson perhaps one of the major factors
that went into the court's decision allowing the seller to cure was the
fact that the television set was delivered in its original crate. Deliv39. 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971).
40. 184 S.E.2d at 725 (emphasis added).
41. 5 Conn. Cir. 444, 256 A.2d 522 (1968).
42. 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1981).
43. Id. at 657.
44. See, e.g., Boysen v. Antioch Sheet Metal, Inc., 16 Ill. App. 3d 311, 306 N.E.2d
69 (1974); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968);
Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967); Appleton
State Bank v. Lee, 33 Wis. 2d 690, 148 N.W.2d 1 (1967); Traynor v. Walters, 342 F.
Supp. 455 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
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ery of a factory crated product in ignorance of the defect may have
constituted for this court one kind of reasonable tender. 0 In effect,
the court found that the seller was acting in good faith in delivering
the television set even though it delivered a nonconforming television set. This approach may also explain why a different result was
reached in Zabriskie. The dealer had argued that it is the usage of
the automobile trade that a buyer accept a new automobile, although containing defects of manufacture, if such defects can be and
are seaonably cured by the seller. The court admitted that such a
custom may exist but nevertheless rejected it, stating, "[p]erhaps
this represents prevailing views in the automobile industry which
have, over the years, served to blanket injustices and inequities committed upon buyers who demurred in the light of the unequal positions of strength between the parties.'"'8 From this statement one
gets the impression that the court was not favorably impressed by
the actions of this particular seller nor, for that matter, by the actions of the entire automobile industry.
The seller's good faith may also have been the determinative factor in Bartus v. Riccardi. 47 The buyer had purchased a specified
model of hearing aid, but was delivered a different but "new and
improved" model. After experiencing difficulty with the hearing aid
and discovering that it was not the specific one ordered, the buyer
returned it to the seller and refused to deal further with him.
Though very little was said about the language of section 2-508(2),
the court held that the seller had the right to cure because "under
the circumstances the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that
the newer model would be accepted . . . .''48 It is certainly difficult
to question the good faith of a seller who delivers a newer or ostensibly better good than that required by the sales contract.
A third theoretical approach has been based on an interpretation
of the phrase "further reasonable time" found in section 2508(2)-focusing on what is a reasonable time and indeed how long
the seller is permitted to try to cure a nonconforming tender. A
buyer has been permitted to reject after unsuccessful efforts by the
seller to cure or where it is apparent that the particular defect cannot be cured. 49 Where the seller has attempted to cure but has failed
45.

Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).

46.

Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. at 456, 240 A.2d at 204.

47.

55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967).

48.

Id. at 6, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 225.

49.

See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601, 480 S.W.2d 133 (1972);
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to do so, the courts, by a simple shift of focus, have been able to
completely ignore the question of whether the seller had a right to
cure in the first place. 110
All of the above cases are, we feel, of doubtful authority on the
question of a seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2). In each
case the contract did not specify a date for delivery. It may be argued that the disposition in each case actually could have been
made pursuant to section 2-508(1), applying the standard of section
2-309(1) that where no time for shipment or delivery is set forth,
delivery is to be made within a "reasonable time. " 111 If a seller's right
to cure depends upon application of section 2-508(1) then, of course,
the seller's belief in the acceptability of the tender becomes irrelevant. This may explain the lack of attention given to this requirement by the courts. The only decision discussed so far which does
allude to the requirement of reasonable belief in the acceptability of
the goods is Wilson; however, in Wilson the court simply equated
the word "acceptable" with the word "conforming" by concluding
that if the seller is unaware that the tender is nonconforming, then
he has "reasonable grounds to believe [that a non-conforming
tender] would be acceptable." 112 The focus of the court's attention
was not on the right to cure but on the appropriate method of effecting a cure. The same is true for the decision in Zabriskie in
which the court assumed a right to cure and focused only on what
constitutes an acceptable method of cure. 118 If these two cases establish a "magnitude of the defect" test, such a test would only be relevant when determining the permissible method of cure, not when
determining whether the seller has the right to cure.
Two cases deserve special mention because in both the courts
did not blind themselves to the "reasonable grounds to believe
would be acceptable" language in section 2-508(2) and did attempt
to impart some meaning to this phrase. In Meads v. Davis, 114 the
Conte v. Devan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Hayes v. Hettinga, 228 N.W.2d 181(Iowa1975); Transcontinental Refrig. Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont.
12, 585 P.2d 1301 (1978).
50.

See cases cited supra note 49.

51.

U.C.C. § 2-309 provides, in part:
Absence of Specific Time Provisions; Notice of Termination
(1) The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a contract
if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be a reasonable time.

52.

Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).

53.

Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).

54.

22 N.C. App. 479, 206 S.E.2d 868 (1974).
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court stated:
Obviously this section deals with the situation in which the seller
knows prior to delivery that the goods are not in conformity, but has
reason to believe that the buyer will accept. An example of such a
situation might be where the buyer orders goods no longer carried by
the seller, but the seller has goods which will perform the same
function. 55

The court then concluded, however, that the time for performance
had not expired and permitted the seller to cure pursuant to section
2-508(1), thereby relegating its discussion of section 2-508(2) to
dicta.
The second case is Joe Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York. 56 After concluding that the seller's time for performance had expired, the court focused on the language of section 2508(2). The court agreed with the foregoing statement in Meads
that section 2-508(2) will permit a seller to cure if he had pre-delivery knowledge of the nonconformity but nevertheless reasonably believed the tender would be accepted. The court, however, refused to
accept the assertion that the application of section 2-508(2) is limited exclusively to such circumstances, writing:
The remedy should be available to any seller who has a reasonable
good faith ground to believe that the original shipment would be accepted. The dichotomy sought to be advanced by the Nordstrom disciples (which would bar redress·to those without predelivery knowledge of conditions causing non-conformity, but affords relief to those
who ship despite knowledge of defect or non-conformity) is totally
convoluted, unjust and incongruent. The innocent seller who ships his
goods in good faith, reasonably believing that they are conforming and
acceptable would be given no relief or redress, but all of the curative
power of the statute would be made available to a more culpable seller
who delivers his non-conforming wares despite existing knowledge of
its [sic] defective, non-conforming qualities. It is difficult to believe
that a construction rewarding culpability and penalizing innocence is
preferable, or consistent with the remedial intent of the creators of
this remedy. To the contrary, this Court believes that more compelling equitable considerations exist to extend the § 2-508(2) remedy to
those innocent sellers who have no prior predelivery knowledge of
non-conformity, and only first learn of a defect following a purchaser's
55.
56.

Id. at _, 206 S.E.2d at 869.

107 Misc.2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
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post-delivery rejection of the merchandise as non-conforming. This
construction facilitates the Code's mandate of liberal construction
(UCC § 1-102) and administration (UCC § 1-106[1]) based upon an
imposed obligation of good faith in performance and enforcement
(UCC § 1-203).111

The judicial resolution of the rejection-cure conflict represented
by these cases is by no means clear. There appears to be a tendency
to avoid the conflict by resolving the disputes under section 2508(1). If this cannot be accomplished because the time for performance has clearly elapsed, courts seem to follow the myriad of factors
suggested by the academic literature. Resolution of the conflict is
determined by various tests, including the magnitude of the defect,
the good faith of the buyer or seller, or the ease and ability of the
seller to cure. As Summers and White admit, "How one generalizes
from the ... cases ... is not clear."118 The current state of the law
on the applicability of section 2-508(2) is probably best stated by
Professor Miniter. 119 After reviewing a number of cases decided
under this section, he concludes that the courts have focused on
both the substantiality of the defect and the good faith of the parties and states that "[c]ure has therefore become discretionary." 60
III.

AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE REJECTION-CURE
CONFLICT

As should be apparent at this point, considerable interpretive
difficulties have surrounded section 2-508(2) and its interaction with
section 2-601. Courts and commentators alike have addressed the
issue of the proper scope and application of the allegedly ill-drafted
provision and a myriad of analyses have resulted. We believe that
neither difficulty nor confusion need accompany an understanding
and application of section 2-508(2). If a clear, reasonable, and practicable interpretation of the section is achieved, the section can become a useful tool in promoting the objectives of the Code without
the need for redrafting.
Although section 2-601 permits the buyer to reject the whole if
57.

Id. at 389-90, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 632.

58. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 321.
59. See Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 13 GA. L. REV. 805
(1979).
60.

Id. at 835.
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the goods or tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, 81 other sections impact on the buyer's right to reject and
consequently narrow the scope of section 2-601. When the seller is
required or authorized to send goods to the buyer, section 2-504
specifies that the seller's shipment duties include making a proper
contract for shipment, obtaining and tendering the necessary shipping documents, and promptly notifying the buyer of the shipment. 82 The seller's failure to meet these requirements results in an
improper tender of delivery,83 giving rise to the buyer's section 2-601
61.

See supra note 2.

62. U.C.C. § 2-504 provides:
Shipment by Seller
Where the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer
and the contract does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination, then unless otherwise agreed he must
(a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such a
contract for their transportation as may be reasonable having regard to
the nature of the goods and other circumstances of the case; and
(b) obtain and promptly deliver or tender in due form any document
necessary to enable the buyer to obtain possession of the goods or otherwise required by the agreement or by usage of trade; and
(c) promptly notify the buyer of the shipment.
Failure to notify the buyer under paragraph (c) or to make a proper contract
under paragraph (a) is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss
ensues.
63. U.C.C. § 2-503 provides, in part:
Manner of Seller's Tender of Delivery
(1) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming
goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably
necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time and place for
tender are determined by the agreement and this Article, and in particular
(a) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they must
be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the
buyer to take possession; but
(b) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably
suited to the receipt of the goods.
(2) Where the case is within the next section respecting shipment tender
requires that the seller comply with its provisions.
(3) Where the seller is required to deliver at a particular destination tender
requires that he comply with subsection (1) and also in any appropriate case
tender documents as described in subsections (4) and (5) of this section.
(5) Where the contract requires the seller to deliver documents
(a) he must tender all such documents in correct form, except as provided in this Article with respect to bills of lading in a set (subsection
(2) of Section 2-323); and
(b) tender through customary banking channels is sufficient and dis-
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rejection right, 84 however, section 2-504 provides that failure to notify the buyer of the shipment or failure to make a proper contract
for shipment is a ground for rejection only if material delay or loss
ensues. Therefore, the section 2-601 right to reject arising from an
improper tender of delivery will not automatically relieve the buyer
of his section 2-301 80 duty to accept and pay.
A further limitation of the buyer's right to reject occurs with a
section 2-612 installment contract. 88 Since, by definition, an installment contract is one which requires or authorizes delivery of goods
in separate lots, 87 the buyer's section 2-601 right to reject is qualified
in such contracts to situations where "the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured or if
the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; . . . if the
non-conformity does not . . . substantially [impair] the value of the
whole contract [so that] there is a breach of the whole," then the
buyer must accept the nonconforming installment if the seller gives
adequate assurances of its cure. 88
Subsection (1) of section 2-508 is clear in its intent and purpose
and has not given rise to significant judicial conflict. When a buyer
honor of a draft accompanying the documents constitutes non-acceptance or rejection.
64.

See supra note 2.

65. U.C.C. § 2-301 provides:
General Obligations of Parties
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer
is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.
66.

U.C.C. § 2-612 provides:
"Installment Contract"; Breach
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if the
non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot
be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; but if
the non-conformity does not fall within subsection (3) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must accept that installment.
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract there is a breach of
the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the contract if he accepts a nonconforming installment without seasonably notifying of cancellation or if he
brings an action with respect only to past installments or demands performance as to future installments.
67.

68 ..

u.c.c.
u.c.c.

§ 2-612(1).
§ 2-612(3).
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uses his right to reject a nonconforming tender or delivery, and the
time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may cure by
making a conforming tender if he can do so within the contracted
time for performance. 89 In effect, this is a no-harm, no-foul rule. Assuming the seller can cure within the contract time, no harm falls
upon the buyer. Thus, the Code expressly prohibits the buyer in this
situation from using his right of rejection to get out of the contract.
Wise sellers can use this section to prevent rejections by specifying a
definite date of delivery, and tendering before that date. Should a
defect appear when the buyer inspects, the seller can cure and still
be protected by the fact that the time for performance has not yet
run.
When, however, the time for performance has run and the buyer
rejects, the seller's right to cure is limited by section 2-508(2). It is
the interpretive difficulties of this section that have given rise to all
the confusion. Comment 2 explains that the purpose of subsection
(2) is to "avoid injustice to the seller by reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer."70 It adds that the seller is not protected "unless
he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that the tender would be acceptable ".11 As we have noted above, academic commentary has focused primarily on the "reasonable grounds to believe" and the
"with or without money allowance" phrases of section 2-508(2). 72
Additional comment has been addressed to the good faith requirements in all Code sections mandated by section 1-203,73 and a substantial-insubstantial test nowhere to be found in section 2-508(2) or
its official comments. 7" We have not found any commentary on the
word "acceptable," the word we believe is the key to understanding
the limits of the seller's right to cure. 711
The word "acceptable" is nowhere defined in the Code, although
what constitutes an "acceptance" is. 78 Under section 2-606 the buyer
69. See supra note 3.
70.

U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2.

71.

Id. (emphasis added).

See supra Part IA and notes 4, 12 & 17.
73. See UCC Section 2-508, supra note 16.
74. See Hawkland, supra note 24.
75. The academic commentary focusing on section 2-508(2) has been discussed in
Part IA supra. None of this commentary addressed the word "acceptable." At best,
they equated it, as the courts have done, with the word "conforming."
76. U.C.C. § 2-606 provides:
What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
72.
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is deemed to have accepted the goods if he: a) signifies to the seller
that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in
spite of their nonconformity, b) fails to make an effective rejection
by notifying the seller within a reasonable time after the delivery of
the goods, or c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 77 If the meaning of the word "acceptable" as used in section 2508(2) can be found by reference to the Code's definition of acceptance in section 2-606, the seller's right to cure would have to arise in
situations where the seller had reasonable grounds to believe that
the buyer would retain the goods in spite of their nonconformity.
Surely the seller does not anticipate that a buyer would reject goods
and still do an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership. Equally
certain is that a seller could not reasonably expect that a buyer
wanting to reject would not do so in a reasonable time with proper
notice. In fact, paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection 2-606(1) are
rather like penal provisions, creating a statutory acceptance when
the buyer has ineffectively rejected or used the goods as if he had
accepted. The major consequence of having found an acceptance is
that the buyer, once having accepted the goods, can only revoke his
acceptance in accordance with section 2-608. 78 This section essen(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the
seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them
in spite of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602),
but such acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable
opportunity to inspect them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act
is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by
him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire
unit.
77. Id.
78. U.C.C. § 2-608 provides:
Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or in Part
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance
or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
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tially limits revocations to situations where the nonconformities are
substantial in nature. 79 Consequently where, prior to acceptance, a
buyer could reject for any nonconformity, 80 after acceptance a buyer
can revoke his acceptance only if a substantial nonconformity exists. 81 If, therefore, the meaning of the word "acceptable" is equated
solely with the section 2-606(1)(a) definition of "acceptance," the
crucial phrase in section 2-508(2) would read: "which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be retained by the buyer in
spite of their nonconformity . . . . "Read this way, the seller's right
to cure would only arise in situations where the seller knew beforehand that the goods were not conforming, but had reasonable
grounds to believe they would be accepted in spite of their nonconformity. Such reasonable grounds of belief arise from various contexts, including prior course of dealing, course of performance, and
usage of trade, as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract. 82
Equating the word "acceptable" with the section 2-606(1)(a)
phrase "retain[ed by the buyer] in spite of their non-conformity"
suggests very clearly-defined situations that give rise to the seller's
right to cure. Under the facts of Bartus v. Riccardi, 88 a seller who
knows that the goods are not conforming because they are not the
exact goods requested, but rather a newer and improved model of
hearing aid for the same price, could rely on the particular circumstances of the case to assert reasonable grounds to believe that the
buyer would retain them in spite of their nonconformity. Indeed,
any seller providing at the contract price newer or better goods than
the contract calls for would be "surprised" by the buyer's rejection.
One could also find a rejection "surprising" where a seller delivers
nonconforming goods to the buyer, the nonconformity arising because the seller did not have the quantity in stock required by the
terms of the contract. If the seller deducted from the price the
amount not delivered, and this kind of deduction was a practice in
the trade, the buyer's rejection would indeed be surprising. These
two examples provide instances where the seller's right to cure
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to
the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
79. Id.
80.

See supra note 2.

81.

See supra note 7.

82.

See U.C.C. § 2-508, Comment 2.

83.

55 Misc.2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967).
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seems proper. If section 2-508(2) were read to be limited to situations where the seller knew beforehand that the goods were not conforming, and had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer
would retain them in spite of their nonconformity, the "perfect
tender rule" as embodied in section 2-601 would remain strong and
its exceptions would be few. In addition, the scope of the seller's
right to cure would be well-defined and clear and could be applied
with the kind of uniformity the Code desires to achieve. 84
Our review of the judicial constructions of section 2-508(2)
shows, however, that clarity and uniformity are not so easily
achieved. Perhaps most of the confusion surrounding section 2508(2) has its origin in the holding of Wilson v. Sampoli. 86 As noted
above, the court in that seminal case refused to permit the buyer of
a defective television set to reject and end the transaction at that
point. Rather, the court held that the seller had a right to cure
under section 2-508(2) and that the buyer had breached by not permitting the seller to remove goods from the buyer's premises to effectuate a cure. 88 The Wilson court accepted the seller's argument
that it had reasonable grounds to believe the goods would be acceptable because the television delivered was a brand new, uncrated television. The seller's argument was that he thought the goods would
be conforming (and therefore acceptable) because the seller was a
retail middleman, and had no reason to suspect that the television
was defective. 87 The effect of this decision was to set a precedent
that permitted sellers to assert the right to cure in situations where
they did not know beforehand that the goods were nonconforming.
The decision naturally broadens the class of sellers who have a right
to use section 2-508(2), and correspondingly narrows the situations
in which the seller can effectively assert the right to reject, and
thereby cancel the contract. 88 It also gives rise to the notion that any
time a seller had reasonable grounds to believe the goods were conforming, it would be permitted an additional reasonable time to cure
the defect. This enlarges the class of sellers able to invoke the section 2-508(2) right to cure to such an extent that it is easy to understand how courts quickly seized on the substantial-insubstantial defect test suggested by some commentators to preserve, to some
84.

See supra note 1.

85.

228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).

86. Id. at 849.
87.

Id.

88.

See

WHITE

&

SUMMERS,

supra note 18.
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extent at least, the buyer's right to reject and cancel. 89
We believe that there are two serious flaws in the position taken
by the Wilson court, the first involving equating the word "conforming" with section 2-508(2)'s "acceptable," the second involving
the generation of a substantial-insubstantial defect standard never
provided for in the interplay between section 2-601 and section 2508. The notion that the word "acceptable" used in section 2-508(2)
can be substituted with the word "conforming" can be dispelled immediately by the realization that the drafters did not say "conforming." If the drafters had meant to say "conforming", it would
not have been difficult to use that word in light of the fact that
"conforming" is defined in the Code. 90 A better approach is to take
the position that the drafters said what they meant and meant what
they said, namely "acceptable." Furthermore, equating the two
words raises serious policy questions. Sellers at the retail level would
too easily be allowed to duck their primary duty of tendering conforming goods. 91 This result necessarily follows because such retail
sellers would always be allowed to cure defective goods that they
delivered uncrated and unexamined by alleging that they assumed
the goods were conforming. With the availability of cure ever present, such sellers have little reason to inspect goods prior to delivery,
naturally resulting in fewer conforming tenders. 92 A second reason
that equating the words "conforming" and "acceptable" is bad policy is a corollary to the first. The burden of discovering defects is
unduly placed upon the buyer. While a buyer is charged with the
responsibility of inspecting the goods which he purchases,93 he
should not be the one charged with the duty of weeding out factorygrown bad apples. This is especially true when consumer buyers are
involved. Consumer buyers of goods such as television sets, refriger89. See Hawkland, supra note 24.
90. "Goods or conduct, including any part of a performance, are 'conforming' or
conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the
contract." U.C.C. § 2-106(2).
91. See supra note 65.
92. See supra note 90.
93. U.C.C. § 2-513 provides, in part:
Buyer's Right to inspection of Goods
(1) Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where goods are
tendered or delivered or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a
right before payment or acceptance to inspect them at any reasonable place
and time and in any reasonable manner. When the seller is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after their arrival.
See also supra note 76, at 2-606(1)(a).
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ators, automobiles, and other appliances have certain expectations
with regard to their purchases. When such a buyer discovers that
the item purchased is defective, he is forced to suffer the frustration
(sometimes exceedingly high) and the delay of jousting with the
seller for a remedy. Often the remedy comes in the form of repair.
Even assuming that the repair is sufficiently accomplished, the
buyer is left having bought and paid for something he did not agree
to purchase-a repaired item.
An equally serious objection to equating the words "acceptable"
and "conforming" arises from courts which attempt to limit the
broad class of sellers such an equation begets by adopting a "magnitude of defect" test. 94 The drafters of the Code expressly provide for
such a test in two instances-for goods which have been accepted
and for installment contracts. 911 Good policy reasons for using such a
test in these two situations are apparent. Restricting buyers who accept goods to revocation only for substantial defects encourages buyers to make use of their section 2-513 right to inspection and their
corresponding section 2-601 right to reject for any nonconforJD,ity.
With installment contracts, the substantial defect test resolves the
confusion under common law as to when and if buyers could extricate themselves from contracts requiring a series of deliveries by alleging a minor nonconformity in one of the shipments. 98 The rigid
requirement of section 2-612(2) limiting the buyer's right to revoke
acceptance for substantial breaches which cannot be cured91 encourages the adjustment and completion of such contracts, thus facilitating modern commercial transactions. 98
The application of a magnitude of the defect test in situations
where an acceptance is not found, however, is somewhat puzzling. As
mentioned above, application of such a test in rejection cases is
clearly contrary to the intent and purport of section 2-601. It also
finds no express support anywhere in the Code. Furthermore, application of such a test clearly ignores the distinction which the Code
makes between cases where an acceptance has occurred and those
where it has not. Implying such a test from the language of section
2-508(2) amounts either to blindness or plain disregard for the fact
94. See Beco, Inc. v. Minnechaug Golf Course, Inc., 5 Conn. Cir. 444, 256 A.2d
522 (1968), Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654 (Minn.
1981); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971).
95. See supra notes 66 & 78.
96. See Peters, supra note 4, at 223-27.
97. See supra note 66.
98. See supra note 1.
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that the drafters did not intend a magnitude of the defect test to
attend the right to reject. If they had, the drafters would have simply written it into the Code with as much ease as they did when
drafting section 2-608.
Assuming, therefore, that the drafters of the Code specifically
chose to use the word "acceptable" as distinct from the word "conforming," we are back to the position that the only sellers given a
right to cure by section 2-508(2), and the further reasonable time to
cure the section affords, are those sellers who actually knew beforehand that the goods were not conforming, but had reasonable
grounds to believe that the buyer would retain them in spite of their
nonconformity. This essentially is the classic Nordstrom position so
forcefully decried in Joe Oil USA, Ine. 99 The major objection to this
somewhat restrictive literal reading of section 2-508(2) is that sellers
who knew they were delivering nonconforming goods were afforded
the cure remedy, while "innocent" sellers who did not, and perhaps
could not,Ioo know of the nonconformity were not given an additional reasonable amount of time to cure. If left at this level, it
would indeed seem unfair to permit those who knowingly breach to
cure while denying innocent breaching persons such as retailers a
similar right. This clearly is the dilemma that led the Joe Oil USA
court to afford the seller the right to cure. IoI
A relatively simple way to avoid this apparent injustice is to
charge all sellers with knowledge of nonconformities. Comment 2 to
section 2-508(2) states that "[t]he seller is charged with commercial
knowledge of any factors in a particular sales situation which require him to comply strictly with his obligations under the contract
. . . . "I 02 This would impute constructive knowledge of the nonconformity to sellers who do not "open the crates," thus permitting
such sellers to assert that they initially qualify for the right to cure
under section 2-508(2) by knowing that the goods were not conforming. The result of such "imputed knowledge" would be that
both innocent and knowing sellers of nonconforming goods could
cure if they had "reasonable grounds to believe [that goods] would
be acceptable."Ios It is at this point that the academic focus on the
"reasonable grounds to believe" test becomes useful. Rather than
99.

107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).

100.

Id.

101.

Id.

102.

U.C.C. § 2-508(2), supra note 3.

103.

See U.C.C. § 2-508(2), supra note 3.

1396

TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

equating "acceptable" with "conforming" and suffering the confusion that results, courts could address in each instance the question
of whether or not a seller, knowing that the goods were not conforming, had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer would retain such nonconforming goods in spite of the nonconformity. The
literature surrounding the "reasonable grounds to believe" test emphasizes the factors of good faith and the magnitude of the defect.
As we discussed above, the combination of the use of these tests
without a clear understanding of the class of sellers to which they
apply and the misequation of the words "acceptable" and "conforming" has resulted in confusion and lack of predictability.
The concepts of good faith and substantial defect can actually be
seen to work hand-in-hand once the word "acceptable" is taken literally. Assuming the seller knows that the goods are not conforming,
when will that seller have reasonable grounds to believe that the
buyer will retain them? Professor Hawkland argues that the buyer's
right to reject implies a good faith rejection. 104 He then makes use of
the magnitude of defect test to ascertain whether the rejection was
made in good faith or not. Substantially defective goods are always
subject to rejection, while goods having only minor defects are
not. 105 The problem with this analysis is that it recognizes no distinction between merchant and nonmerchant buyers, whereas the
Code makes a clear distinction between the good faith requirements
of merchants and nonmerchants. The test of good faith for the
nonmerchant is honesty in fact. 106 The merchant, however, is required to be not only subjectively honest, but is further held to the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade. 107 Recognizing this distinction aids in understanding the situations in which a buyer's rejection can be seen to be made in good
faith.
Because merchants are held to the more objective commercial
standards of the trade, it becomes understandable that a seller
would be genuinely surprised by a rejection from a merchant buyer
on the grounds of an insubstantial nonconformity. 108 Indeed, if such
a seller could establish that it was not a practice in the trade or that
the merchant buyer had accepted goods with minor nonconformities
104.

See Hawkland, supra note 24.

105.

Id. See supra note 28.

106.

See supra note 28.

107.

See supra note 28.

108.

See Hawkland, supra note 24.
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in the past, he would have established both that the merchant buyer
did not act in good faith and that his own belief that the goods
would be accepted was reasonable. 109 A buyer purchasing a $100,000
printing press, for example, could not in good faith reject the press
and cancel the contract because of a scratch on the front panel. For
merchant buyers, then, the good faith and magnitude of defect tests
work together to give fairly objective guidelines to the rejection-cure
interplay.
The situation changes drastically, however, when we substitute a
consumer buyer for the merchant buyer. The good faith required of
a consumer purchaser is mere honesty in fact-a subjective test.
Certainly when the defect is major, the consumer purchaser (as well
as the merchant buyer) should have the ability to reject and cancel.
Even had the consumer accepted the goods by definition, his right
to revoke his acceptance would remain if a substantial defect exists.110 What about the new car that is scratched, however, or the
television with a reddish tinge? It is hard to believe that such a consumer, in all subjective honesty, would not prefer a new item rather
than a "repainted" or "fixed" television. Indeed, when the seller
readily exchanges the good for a new item, the consumer buyer will
normally accept the new item and the rejection-cure relationship becomes moot. Sellers, however, are more likely to want to cure by
fixing the item, as is shown in the Wilson and Zabriskie cases. m
Should the consumer buyer be forced to accept such cure, even if
the defect was only minor, or should the consumer buyer be afforded
the right to reject and cancel, demanding a brand new product in
place of the nonconforming product (and, in effect, agreeing to a
new contract)? The answer, of course, depends upon the proper interpretation of the seller's right to cure under section 2-508(2).
Piecing the parts of the section 2-508(2) puzzle together in light
of the issues discussed provides a clearer picture. The sellers who
may attempt to assert section 2-508(2) are sellers who have either
actual or constructive knowledge that the goods sent were not conforming. These sellers must then show, to rightfully claim an additional reasonable amount of time to substitute conforming tender,
that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer would
retain the goods in spite of their nonconformity. Can sellers in good
109. See supra notes 3 & 29.
110. See supra note 76.
111. Zabriskie Chevrolet, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); Wilson v.
Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
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faith reasonably expect merchant buyers to retain the goods if the
nonconformity is minor? The answer is obviously in the affirmative.
Can sellers in good faith reasonably expect consumer buyers to retain the goods if the nonconformity is minor? The answer is obviously in the negative.
The controversy and confusion surrounding the rejection-cure interplay need not have occurred had courts initially read section 2508(2) and section 2-601 literally. A literal reading gives the buyer
the right to reject for any nonconformity. This "perfect tender rule"
could have remained strong had the courts literally read section 2508(2) to apply only to those sellers who knew beforehand that the
goods were not conforming, but had a reasonable belief that they
would be accepted in spite of the nonconformity. Almost blindly,
however, the courts followed the early case of Wilson v. Scampoli
and included in the class of sellers afforded the section 2-508(2)
right to cure sellers who did not know that the goods were nonconforming.112 This naturally generated a substantial-insubstantial test
not literally found in either the sections or the comments to section
2-508 and section 2-601.
Recognizing that courts feel compelled for reasons of justice to
aid innocent or unknowing sellers of nonconforming goods just as
they are directed to aid knowing sellers of nonconforming goods, we
have proposed a "constructive knowledge of defect" rule to bring
both innocent and knowing sellers of nonconforming goods under
section 2-508(2); however, if the courts recognize that "acceptable"
cannot be equated with "conforming," the breadth of the seller's
right to cure remains limited to those surprising situations where
merchant buyers reject for insubstantial defects. We feel that this
understanding of the rejection-cure relationship provides more objective tests to ascertain section 2-508(2)'s proper scope and thereby
affords a predictive aspect to the rejection-cure relationship not currently available. The final result will be that sellers will once again
know what they are expected to deliver, and buyers will know what
to expect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A survey of both the case law and the commentary on section 2508(2) demonstrates that it has been the subject of inconsistent interpretation. As a consequence, it is difficult to predict when or
112.

See cases cited supra note 49.
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under what circumstances a seller will be permitted to cure a nonconforming tender after the time for performance has expired.
Our analysis indicates that a right to cure under section 2-508(2)
should depend on whether or not the seller had reasonable grounds
to believe the tender would be acceptable. Whether reasonable
grounds exist for the seller's belief would depend on all factors involved in the particular sales transaction. Furthermore, the fact that
a seller is ignorant of a defect in the product should not result in an
automatic right to cure. The seller should be charged with knowledge of the true condition of what he is selling. Such an approach is
consistent with the language of section 2-508(2) and can easily be
applied by the courts. If this approach is used, section 2-508(2) will
truly provide a uniform standard for determining a seller's right to
cure while preserving and protecting already existing rights and
remedies of a buyer under the Code.

